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Application of The Doctrine of Equivalents to
Patent Infringement Cases: A Patent Practitioner's
Dilemma
I. INTRODUCTION
A valid patent confers upon its owner the right to exclude others
from making, using or selling their invention throughout the
United States during the term of the patent.1 Anyone who makes,
uses or sells the patented item without the patentee's permission is
liable for literal infringement.2 The question of infringement, on
the surface, appears to be somewhat straightforward. Indeed, the
question of literal infringement may be properly framed as: did the
alleged infringer make, use or sell the patented invention without
the patent owner's permission? The Federal Circuit3 has noted on
many occasions that the determination of literal infringement en-
compasses a two step process."
In conducting the Federal Circuit's two step approach, a court
1. 35 USC § 154 (Supp 1990) specifically provides:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee,
his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, . . . of the right to exclude others
from making using or selling the invention throughout the United States and, if the
invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using or selling throughout
the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that pro-
cess . . .
Id.
Not6 however, that the term of a design patent is limited to a fourteen year period by 35
USC § 173 (1988).
2. 35 USC § 271(a) states that "... whoever without authority makes, uses or sells
any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent." 35 USC § 271(a) (1988).
3. The Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,
Pub L No 97-164, § 126, 96 Stat 25, 37 codified as 28 USC § 1295 (1982 & Supp 1990) and
has exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals in patent cases. The Federal Circuit replaced the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and was created for the purpose of achieving uni-
formity in the application of substantive patent law. See for example, Atari, Inc. v JS & A
Group, Inc., 747 F2d 1422 (Fed Cir 1984); Panduit Corp. v All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744
F2d 1564 (Fed Cir 1984); Chemical Engineering Corp. v Marlo, Inc., 754 F2d 331 (Fed Cir
1984).
4. See for example, Moleculon Res. Corp. v CBS, Inc., 793 F2d 1261 (Fed Cir 1986),
cert denied, 479 US 1030 (1987); Mannesmann Demag Corp. v Engineered Metal Prods.
Co., 793 F2d 1279 (Fed Cir 1986); Standard Oil Co. v American Cyanamid Co., 774 F2d 448
(Fed Cir 1985); and Palumbo v Don-Joy Co., 762 F2d 969 (Fed Cir 1985).
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must first define what constitutes the "patented invention."5 After
the patented invention has been defined, the court must then de-
termine whether the patented invention covers the accused device
or process.6 Simply stated, the court must first ascertain what is
patented and thereafter determine whether the patented invention
has been made, used or sold by another without the patentee's per-
mission. 7 The most vexatious problem facing a court in executing
this two step approach is couched in the determination of what
constitutes the "patented invention."
A court begins this two step process by first reviewing and inter-
preting the patent claims. The patent statute8 requires an inventor
to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter of
his invention.9 In accordance with 35 USC section 112, an inven-
tor's claims must be set forth, at the end of the patent application's
written specification." The United States Supreme Court in White
v Dunbar" set forth the patent claim's importance as follows:
The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of
making the patentee define precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust
to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner
different from the plain import of' its terms. 2
Furthermore, Circuit Judge Nies explained in Pennwalt Corp. v
Durand-Wayland, Inc.,'3 that "[a] patent claim is not intended to
be and cannot be only a general suggestion of an invention."' 4
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See for example, Fromson v Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F2d 1565 (Fed Cir
1983); and SSIH Equip. S.A. v United States ITC, 718 F2d 365 (Fed Cir 1983).
8. The patent statute is codified at 35 USC §§ 1-376 (1982 & Supp 1990).
9. 35 USC § 112 (1988). This section of the statute sets forth the requirements for
the patent specification and provides in part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the man-
ner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode con-
templated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. The specification shall con-
clude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Id.
10. Id. -
11. 119 US 47 (1886).
12. White, 119 US at 52.
13. 833 F2d 931 (Fed Cir 1987), cert denied, 485 US 961 (1988). Judge Nies, in noting
that no precedent was overruled or modified by the majority opinion, offered the quoted




Judge Nies further added, "[t]he invention is defined by the limi-
tations set out in the claim which thereby fix the scope of protec-
tion to which the patentee is entitled.
1 5
After a court has determined the "essence" of the patented in-
vention through careful interpretation of the patent claims, the
court must then determine whether these claims "read on" the ac-
cused device."6 This means that the alleged infringing device is re-
viewed to determine if it is substantially described by the claims.
17
If the claims are found to "read on" the accused device, then lit-
eral infringement is established.
However, if literal infringement cannot be established, infringe-
ment may still be found under the application of the "doctrine of
equivalents." Under the doctrine of equivalents, an accused device
may be held to infringe a patent if "it performs substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result."1 8 While the doctrine of equivalents serves an equitable
purpose," its use introduces an uncertainty concerning the scope
of protection provided by the patent claims. Such uncertainty
makes accurately assessing the likely outcome of infringement liti-
gation difficult for patent practitioners.
Since its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit has struggled to
develop a systematic approach for applying the doctrine of
equivalents to patent infringement issues. During this period, the
Federal Circuit has vacillated greatly between strict and liberal ap-
plications of the doctrine of equivalents. Illustrative of the Federal




18. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 US 605, 608 (1950). The
Federal Circuit stated in Stewart- Warner Corp v City of Pontiac, Michigan, 767 F2d 1563
(Fed Cir 1985), that assessing equivalency involves a determination of whether the claimed
invention and alleged infringing device, which are necessarily different, perform substan-
tially the same function in substantially the same way to give the same result. Id at 1570.
19. See Pennwalt Corp. v Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F2d 931 (Fed Cir 1987), cert
denied, 485 US 961 (1988). In a lengthy commentary, Circuit Judge Newman pointed out
that since the United States Supreme Court's holding in Winans v Demead, 56 US 330
(1853), the decisions "have given full respect to the equitable purposes of the doctrine."
Pennwalt, 833 F2d at 960; see notes 24-27 and accompanying text. Circuit Judge Newman
further explained that "[t]he decisions show a consistent concern for attempted evasions of
patent rights by changes that do not affect the substance of the invention." Pennwalt, 833
F2d at 960.
20. These cases have been referred to, by at least one commentator, as the "Federal
Circuit Trilogy." See Barry E. Bretschneider, The Doctrine vf Equivalents After Pennwalt
and Texas Instruments, 26 Patent Law Annual 3-1 (1988).
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ments, Inc. v United States Int'l Trade Commission,2 Perkin-El-
mer Corp. v Westinghouse Electric Corp.,22 and Pennwalt Corp. v
Durand-Wayland, Inc.2' This comment will review the Federal
Circuit's treatment of the doctrine of equivalents and attempt to
provide some insight concerning its application to patent infringe-
ment suits.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The doctrine of equivalents was first enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in the 1853 case of Winans v Demead.24 In
Winans, the patentee had claimed a conical railroad car that pur-
ported to have a number of benefits over the prior art.25 The ac-
cused infringing device, though octagonal in shape, otherwise of-
fered the same advantages as the patentee's invention.26 In holding
that the conical and octagonal shapes were substantially the same,
the Court stated that:
Where form and substance are inseparable, it is enough to look at the form
only. Where they are separable; where the whole substance of the invention
may be copied in a different form, it is the duty of the courts and juries to
look through the form for the substance of the invention - for that which
entitled the inventor to his patent, and which the patent was designed to
secure; where that is found, there is an infringement; and it is not a
defen[s]e, that it is embodied in a form not described in the terms claimed
by the patentee.
27
As patent law continued to develop, the Supreme Court fre-
quently applied the doctrine of equivalents to cases where literal
infringement could not be established.28 The Supreme Court's
most recent treatment of the doctrine of equivalents occurred in
Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v Linde Air Products Co.29 In
Graver Tank, the patent covered an electric welding process that
utilized welding fluxes.8 0 Specifically, the patentee had claimed
21. 805 F2d 1558 (Fed Cir 1986), rehearing denied, 846 F2d 1369 (Fed Cir 1988).
22. 822 F2d 1528 (Fed Cir 1987).
23. 833 F2d 931 (Fed Cir 1987), cert denied, 485 US 961 (1988).
24. 56 US 330 (1853).
25. Winans, 56 US at 332.
26. Id.
27. Winans, 56 US at 343.
28. For a thorough review of the United States Supreme Court's treatment of the doc-
trine of equivalents since the Winans decision, see Judge Newman's commentary in
Pennwalt Corp. v Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F2d 931, 954-75 (Fed Cir 1987).
29. 339 US 605 (1950).
30. Graver Tank, 339 US at 606. Welding flux is a blanket of molten metal compounds
that "provides heating means, controls the rate, penetration and quality of welding and
Vol. 29:91
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fluxes that consisted essentially of a mixture of alkaline earth
metal silicate and calcium fluoride.3 1 The alleged infringing flux, on
the other hand, was substantially similar to the claimed flux except
that it substituted silicates of calcium and manganese for silicates
of calcium and magnesium.32 The Court noted that even though
manganese was not an alkaline earth metal, the two fluxes pro-
duced the same kind of weld quality.
33
The Court held that while the accused flux did not infringe the
claimed flux literally, it did infringe under the doctrine of
equivalents.3 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the
doctrine of equivalents was created so that "one may not practice a
fraud on a patent. '35 The Court went on to explain that "the the-
ory on which [the doctrine of equivalents] was founded is 'that if
two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and
accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even
though they differ in name, form, or shape.' ",36
In emphasizing that there may be circumstances where the doc-
trine should be applied to combinations of old elements, the Court
also noted that there may be instances where it might be appropri-
ate to apply the doctrine against the patentee and in favor of the
alleged infringer.3 7 The Court explained that "where a device is so
far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs
the same or similar function in a substantially different way, but
protects the molten metal." Linde Air Products Co. v Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 167 F2d 531,
532-33 (7th Cir 1948).
31. Graver Tank, 339 US at 610. The Court noted that the claimed flux actually con-
tained the mixture of silicate of calcium and silicate of magnesium. Id.
32. Id. The district court held that the claims in question were valid and thereby in-
fringed. Linde Air Prods. Co. v Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 86 F Supp 191, 199-200 (N D Ind
1947). The district court also held, however, that the patentee's process claims and remain-
ing flux claims were not valid and therefore could not be infringed upon by the defendant's
invention. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding of infringement, but
reversed the district court as to the invalidity of the patentee's other claims. Linde Air
Prods. Co. v Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 167 F2d 531 (7th Cir 1948). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and after reviewing the record, reversed the court of appeals and rein-
stated the district court's holding. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 US
271 (1949). The Supreme Court then granted rehearing on the issue of infringement and the
applicability of the doctrine of equivalents to the alleged infringing claims. Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 US 605 (1950).
33. Graver Tank, 339 US at 610.
34. Id.
35. Id at 608.
36. Id at 608 (citing Union Paper Bag Machine Co. v Murphy, 97 US 120, 125 (1878)).
37. Graver Tank, 339 US at 608. The application of the doctrine of equivalents against
the patentee is known as the "reverse" doctrine of equivalents. See SRI Intern v Matsu-
shita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F2d 1107 (Fed Cir 1985).
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nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the doctrine
of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the
patentee's action for infringement."" s
In affirming the district court's holding in Graver Tank, the Su-
preme Court specifically stated:
The question which thus emerges is whether the substitution of manganese
which is not an alkaline earth metal for the magnesium which is, under the
circumstances of the case, and in view of the technology and the prior art, is
a change of such substance as to make the doctrine of equivalents applica-
ble; or conversely, whether under the circumstances the change was so in-
substantial that the trial court's invocation of the doctrine of equivalents
was justified. 39
The Court based its holding on testimony which indicated that al-
kaline metals are often found in manganese ores and that "in the
sense of the patent, manganese could be included as an alkaline
earth metal." 0 The Court also took note of the fact that the prior
art also disclosed the use of manganese silicate as an ingredient in
welding fluxes, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would rec-
ognize that manganese silicate was interchangeable with magne-
sium silicate.4'
In his dissent,4" Justice Black stated that, while he agreed with
the majority that " 'fraud' is bad, 'piracy' is evil, and 'stealing' is
reprehensible," he believed that the petitioners were not charged
with such "malevolence" and that the majority's opinion amounted
to a "sterilization of 'Acts of Congress and prior decisions."43 Spe-
cifically, Justice Black believed that the majority was ignoring the
statutory provisions that required the applicant to "particularly
point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement or combina-
tion which he claims as invention or discovery," by permitting the
patented claim to be broadened. 4 He further stated the Court's
actions amounted to a departure from past precedent which:
38. Graver Tank, 339 US at 608-09 (citing Westinghouse v Boyden Power Brake Co.,
170 US 537, 568 (1898)).
39. Graver Tank, 339 US at 610.
40. Id at 611.
41. Id at 611, 612. In reviewing the prior art disclosures, the Court took note of two
specific patents which taught the use of manganese silicate in welding fluxes. Id. The Court
also noted that there was no evidence present that would indicate that the accused flux was
a product of any research independent of the prior art. Id.
42. Justice Black was joined in dissent by Justice Douglas. Graver Tank, 339 US at
612.
43. Id at 612-13.
44. Id at 613.
Vol. 29:91,
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forbids treating a patent claim 'like a nose of wax which may be turned and
twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the specification, so as to
make it include something more than, or something different from, what its
words express. . . . The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the
very purpose of making 'the patentee define precisely What his invention is;
and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it
in a manner different from the plain import of its terms.'
Justice Black further noted that it was highly probable that the
patentee intentionally excluded magnesium from the claims as
filed for fear that such claims would have been denied or later in-
validated in light of the teachings of the prior art.46
In his concluding remarks, Justice Black expressed a concern
that the Court's application of the doctrine of equivalents made it
impossible for the manufacturer to make 'business decisions based
on the language of the patent claims.' 7 He pointed out that the
manufacturer "must be able, at the peril of heavy infringement
damages, to forecast how far a court relatively unversed in a par-
ticular technological field will expand the claim's language after
considering the testimony of technical experts in that field."'
Indeed, Justice Black's concerns continue to plague inventors
and patent practitioners today. Still, the Graver Tank decision
has, nevertheless provided the' basis for the modern day applica-
tion of the doctrine of equivalents to issues of patent infringement.
In answer to the Graver Tank decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has attempted 'to provide some
guidance in applying the doctrine of equivalents to patent infringe-
ment suits. Some practitioners argue, however, that the Federal
Circuit's treatment of these issues has only served to further the
confusion.'9
45. Graver Tank, 339 US at 614 (citing White v Dunbar, 119 US 47, 51 (1886)).
46. Graver Tank, 339 US at 616-17.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Harris, Three Ambiguities of the Doctrine of Equivalents in the Federal Cir-
cuit, 69 J Pat & Trademarks Off Soc'y 91 (1987). The three ambiguities were set forth as
follows:
[The first ambiguity] involves varying statements of the basic test for applicability of
the doctrine of equivalents. A second [ambiguity] involves the proper approach to the
application of the doctrine, with reference to an approach which focuses upon com-
parison of particular elements of the claimed invention and the accused device . . ;
and an approach which views the claimed invention and the accused device as a
whole. A third ambiguity concerns the proper relationship between the doctrine of
equivalents and the section 112 equivalence doctrine.
Id at 91-92.
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III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S APPROACH
A. The Texas. Instruments Decision
Practitioners' concerns regarding the role of the doctrine of
equivalents in patent infringement cases came to the forefront
with the Federal Circuit's opinion in Texas Instruments, Inc. v
United States International Trade Commission." In Texas In-
struments, the court affirmed an International Trade Commission
ruling that various imported calculators did not, either literally or
under the doctrine of equivalents, infringe Texas Instruments' pat-
ent claim."' Texas Instruments' patent claims were set forth in
"means-plus-function" 52 language in accordance with 35 USC sec-
tion 112, paragraph 6 which provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, ma-
terial or acts in support thereof and such claim shall be construed to cover
the corresponding structure, material and acts described in the specification
or equivalents thereof.53
In its patent infringement claim, Texas Instruments asserted
that the accused calculators performed all of the steps as set forth
50. 805 F2d 1558 (Fed Cir 1986). This case was decided by a three judge panel: Senior
Circuit Judge Cowen, Circuit Judge Davis and Circuit Judge Newman. Id at 1560. Circuit
Judge Newman wrote the original opinion with Judges Cowen and Davis joining. Id. The
Federal Circuit subsequently denied Texas Instruments' petition for rehearing. Texas In-
struments v United States Trade Commission, 846 F2d 1369 (Fed Cir 1988). On rehearing,
Judge Newman wrote an opinion in which Judge Cowen joined, while Judge Davis filed a
separate concurring opinion. Id.
51. The International Trade Commission held that 19 USC section 1337 was not vio-
lated in that Texas Instruments' patent was not infringed by certain imported calculators;
moreover, there was no industry in the United States practicing an invention covered by any
of Texas Instruments' patent claims. In re Certain Portable Electronic Calculators, Inv.
No. 337-TA-198, USITC Pub. No. 1732 (1985).
52. Means-plus-function language allows the applicant to broadly claim elements of
his invention without specifically reciting structural elements. For example, assume the pat-
entee wanted to claim an apparatus that included, among other elements, a helically wound
spring for biasing a lever into an operable position. Instead of actually reciting a "helically
wound spring" in the claim language, the applicant could, in accordance with 35 USC sec-
tion 112, claim the element as follows: "means for biasing said lever into an operable posi-
tion." This permits the applicant to somewhat broaden the scope of his patent claims be-
cause not only will the means-plus-function clause cover "helically wound springs," but also
a myriad of other devices that a potential infringer might use to urge the lever into an
operable position.
53. 35 USC § 112 (1984). Section 112 provides in relevant part:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding struc-
ture, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
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in the patent claims and that the detailed means by which those
steps were to be carried out were the same as or equivalent to the
means described in the patent specification.54 The Administrative
Law Judge held, however, that each of the functions as set forth in
the patent claims was performed in the accused device by a means
that was not specifically described in the patent, and that each
such means was not equivalent to the means shown in the specifi-
cation.5 5 On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Administra-
tive Law Judge's finding of no infringement even though it dis-
agreed with the equivalents analysis.5
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that the ac-
cused calculators did not literally infringe Texas Instruments' pat-
ent under 35 USC section 112. In its discussion of literal infringe-
ment, the court explained that "[a]s an aid in determining the
breadth of equivalents to be afforded means-plus -function clauses
under section 112, paragraph 6, the prosecution history, the other
claims in the patent, expert testimony, and the language of the as-
serted claims may be considered in addition to the specification. '57
The court finally concluded this portion of its analysis by noting
that there was no substantial evidence to support a factual finding
of literal infringement.5 8 Specifically, the court explained that be-
cause there were so many technological changes between what was
disclosed in the specification and what was found in the accused
devices it would "transcend the equitable limits" to find literal
infringement.5 9
The Court then addressed the issue of whether infringement
could be found under the doctrine of equivalents. The court
explained:
[w]hether the issue is equivalency of a means that is described in the speci-
fication to perform a function in a "means" clause of a combination claim
(i.e., literal infringement), or equivalency to the claimed invention as a
whole (i.e., infringement by the doctrine of equivalents), the test is the
54. Texas Instruments, 805 F2d at 1564.
55. Texas Instruments, 805 F2d at 1564. Judge Newman pointed out that "[tihe [Ad-
ministrative Law Judge), finding that each of the means of performing these functions in
the accused calculators embodied, to varying degrees, new or improved technology over that
known or developed at the time [Texas Instruments'] patent application was filed, held that
the means of each step was not an equivalent to that shown in the specification, and thus
found the claims not infringed." Id at 1568.
56. Id.
57. Texas Instruments, 805 F2d at 1568. The court also stated that the pioneer status
of the patented invention should also be considered. Id.
58. Id at 1570-71.
59. Id at 1571.
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same three part test of history: does the asserted equivalent perform sub-
stantially the same function in substantially the same way to accomplish
substantially the same result."
The court stated that there was no infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents, relying on the same reasons offered to support
the finding of no literal infringement.6 1 This holding seemed to di-
rectly conflict with the principle that the doctrine of equivalents
requires the accused device to contain each claim element or its
substantial equivalent, a principle that the court noted was "well
settled" in Lemelson v United States.2 In summary, the Texas
Instruments court incorporated an "invention as a whole"
equivalents analysis. Specifically, the court found that there could
be no literal infringement even though the claims "read-on" the
accused device and the accused device had a structure which was
equivalent to that disclosed in the specification, when each means-
plus-function element was viewed separately. The court then
looked to the invention as a whole in performing its doctrine of
equivalents analysis and also found no infringement. As one com-
mentator put, "[tihe Texas Instruments court seemingly rejected
reliance on the expressed words of the patent claims, looking in-
stead to an amorphous 'invention as a whole.' "63
The Federal Circuit's holding in Texas Instruments was highly
criticized by the patent bar. The court failed to indicate whether
the invention-as-a-whole test relates to the general doctrine of
equivalents or whether it is to be solely a creature of section 112,
paragraph 6 equivalents. The American Intellectual Property Law
Association ("AIPLA") filed an amicus brief with the Federal Cir-
cuit in support of Texas Instruments' petition for rehearing en
60. Id.
61. Texas Instruments, 805 F2d at 1571. The court explained that:
When literal infringement under section 112 paragraph 6 is not present the doctrine
of equivalents may nevertheless apply; and thereby secure to the patentee the fair
scope of the patent . . .In this case, however, where the claimed functions are all
performed in the accused devices, the considerations discussed in part A also apply to
infringement determination in terms of the doctrine of equivalents.
Id. (Citations omitted.)
62. 752 F2d 1538, 1551 (Fed Cir 1985). Specifically, in its discussion of the doctrine of
equivalents, the Lemelson court stated that "li]t is also well settled that each element of a
claim is material and essential, and that in order for a court to find infringement, the plain-
tiff must show the presence of every element or its substantial equivalent in the accused
device." Lemelson v United States, 752 F2d 1538 (1985) (citing Interdent Corp. v United
States, 531 F2d 547, 552 (Ct Cl 1976); Autogiro Co. of America v United States, 384 F2d
391, 403 (Ct Cl 1967)).
63. See Nieman, The Federal Circuit Resolves Ambiguities in the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 70 J Pat & Trademark Off Soc'y 153 (1988).
Vol. 29:91
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banc, arguing that the application of the invention-as-a-whole ap-
proach to the section 112 analysis was contrary to Federal Circuit
precedent.6" In response the Federal Circuit's opinions, which de-
nied Texas Instruments' petition for rehearing, justified the court's
finding of no literal infringement by stating that the accused com-
ponents were not the equivalents of the components disclosed in
the patent specification.65 The court did not separately address the
infringement issues under the doctrine of equivalents.6
B. The Perkin-Elmer Decision
In the case of Perkin-Elmer Corp. v Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,6"
Perkin-Elmer claimed that Westinghouse's accused devices in-
fringed upon Perkin-Elmer's patent for an "Electrodeless Dis-
charge Lamp and Power Coupler" under the doctrine of
equivalents.68 Westinghouse conceded the validity of the patent if
it were construed narrowly, but argued that if the patent was to be
construed broadly it was invalid for lack of specificity, lack of nov-
elty, and obviousness.6 9
The district court found that the accused devices did not liter-
ally satisfy various limitations of the asserted patent claim and
that the accused device did not infringe upon the patent under the
doctrine of equivalents.70 On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court's holding of no infringement by substantially fo-
cusing on one of the structural differences which caused the ac-
cused device to operate differently from the claimed invention.7' In
an attempt to address the concerns over the Federal Circuit's ap-
parently new infringement analysis adopted in Texas Instruments,
Chief Judge Markey commented on the Federal Circuit's prior de-
cision in Hughes Aircraft Co. v United States." Specifically, in
Hughes Aircraft, the court held that it was legal error not to "ap-
ply the doctrine of equivalents to the claimed invention as a
64. See 33 PTCJ 163 (Jan. 1, 1987).
65. Texas Instruments, 846 F2d 1369 (Fed Cir 1988).
66. Id.
67. 822 F2d 1528 (Fed Cir 1987). Chief Judge Markey wrote the majority opinion with
Judge Archer concurring. Id. Circuit Judge Newman filed a dissenting opinion. Id at 1535.
68. Perkin-Elmer, 822 F2d at 1529.
69. Id.
70. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., No. 77 C 1923, Slip op at 16
(E D NY 1985).
71. Perkin-Elmer, 822 F2d at 1534-35.
72. 717 F2d 1351 (Fed Cir 1983).
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whole."73 In writing the Perkin-Elmer decision, however, Chief
Judge Markey explained that the court's statement in Hughes Air-
craft "dealt with an infringement inquiry implicating an entire
claim, as distinguished from a section 112, paragraph 6 inquiry im-
plicating only a 'means plus function' limitation of a claim. ' 74
Chief Judge Markey was alluding to the fact that, while the court
was not going back on the invention-as-a-whole test, such test has
nothing to do with literal infringement of a means plus function
claim under paragraph 6 of section 112. Judge Markey's holding
would appear to directly contradict the court's literal infringement
analysis set forth in Texas Instruments.
Judge Newman, the author of the Texas Instruments opinion,
vigorously dissented in Perkin-Elmer claiming that the court had
departed "from our consistent requirement that the invention as a
whole be considered. 75 Judge Newman maintained that if the
Court would have applied the standards that it had previously es-
tablished (i.e., the "function/way/result" test of Graver Tank7"),
the Westinghouse device would meet all of the requirements of
equivalency as set forth by precedent. 77
A careful analysis of Perkin-Elmer would indicate that the Fed-
eral Circuit disapproved of considering the invention as a whole
when determining literal infringement of means-plus-function
claims. The Federal Circuit in Texas Instruments, on the other
hand, held that one must look to the invention as a whole to deter-
mine if the accused invention crossed the line of literal infringe-
ment. The patent practitioner was left once again to reconcile the
court's various approaches to patent infringement cases.
C. The Pennwalt Decision
In Pennwalt Corp. v Durand-Wayland, Inc.,78 the Federal Cir-
73. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F2d at 1364.
74. Perkin-Elmer, 822 F2d at 1533.
75. Id at 1542 (citing Martin v Barber, 755 F2d 1564, 1568 (Fed Cir 1985); Hughes
Aircraft Co. v United States, 717 F2d 1351, 1364 (Fed Cir 1983); Carman Industries, Inc, v
Wahl, 724 F2d 932, 942 (Fed Cir 1983); Tate Engineering, Inc. v United States, 166 USPQ
329 (Ct Cl 1970)).
76. See notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
77. Perkin-Elmer, 822 F2d at 1542.
78. 833 F2d 931 (Fed Cir 1987), cert denied, 485 US 961 (1988). Circuit Judge Bissel
wrote the majority opinion for the court in which Chief Judge Markey and Circuit Judges
Archer, Davis, Friedman, Nies, and Rich joined. Pennwalt, 833 F2d at 932. Senior Circuit
Judge Bennet filed a dissent-in-part, in which Senior Circuit Judge Cowen and Circuit
Judges Newman and Smith joined. Id. Circuit Judge Nies filed additional views while Cir-
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cuit had the opportunity to set the record straight and clarify its
approach to issues of patent infringement. According to the record,
Pennwalt Corporation sued Durand-Wayland for infringing
Pennwalt's patent entitled "Sorter for Fruit and the Like."7 The
invention purported to rapidly sort items, such as fruit, by color,
weight, or a combination of color and weight.80 There were four
claims at issue, each was constructed in the means-plus-function
language.
81
Claims 1 and 2 described a sorting machine that conveyed items
along a track having an electronic weighing device that produced
an electronic signal proportional to the weight of the item.82 The
device also included signal comparison means, clock means, posi-
tion-indicating means, and discharge means, each of which per-
formed specific functions."3 Claims 10 and 18 described a mul-
tifunctional sorter, whereby an item is transported across the
weighing device and then conveyed past an optical scanner that
produces an electrical signal proportional to the color of the item. 4
The signals from the weighing device and the color sensing device
are then combined and a signal is sent to discharge the item into
the appropriate container.8 " Moreover, the patent's specification
described the details of a "hardwired" network consisting of dis-
crete electrical components which perform each step of the
cuit Judge Newman filed a commentary. Id.
79. Pennwalt, 833 F2d at 932. The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia found that the accused devices did not infringe any claim, literally or under
the doctrine of equivalents. Pennwalt Corp. v Durand- Wayland, Inc., 225 USPQ 558 (N D
Ga 1984).
80. Pennwalt, 833 F2d at 933.
81. Id. Although the Pennwalt patent included 18 different claims, only four of them
(i.e., claims 1, 2, 10, and 18) were at issue and thus considered by the district court.
Pennwalt, 225 USPQ at 564.
82. Pennwalt, 833 F2d at 933. Pennwalt's claims 1 and 2 are reprinted in the district
court's opinion. See Pennwalt, 225 USPQ at 564.
83. Pennwalt, 833 F2d at 933. Specifically, as the item to be sorted was weighed, the
weighing device generated an electronic signal that was thereafter sent to the "signal com-
parison means." Id. The "signal comparison means" compared this signal to pre-developed
reference signals and developed a resulting signal that was sent to the "position indicating
means." Id. "Clock means" was incorporated in the design to signal a change in the position
of an item as it progressed through the invention. See Pennwalt Corp. v Durand- Wayland,
Inc., 225 USPQ 558 (N D Ga 1984). The "position indicating means" received signals from
the "comparison means" and the "clock means" and continuously indicated the position of
the item to be sorted. Id. Finally, the "discharge means" responded to the electronic signal
developed by the "position indicating means" by discharging the items to be sorted at vari-
ous predetermined positions. Id.
84. Id. See Pennwalt, 225 USPQ at 564.
85. Pennwalt, 833 F2d at 933.
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claims.86
Durand-Wayland manufactured and sold two different types of
sorters.87  The two Durand-Wayland sorters used computer
software programs in lieu of a hardwired network of discrete elec-
trical components. 8 The first sorter was operated by a central
processing unit that used one of two possible software programs
designed to permit sorting by weight alone. 9 The second of the
Durand-Wayland sorters used a third software program that per-
mitted the addition of a color detection device to permit sorting by
both weight and color.9 0
The district court applied section 112, paragraph 6 to the claims
in question by incorporating the structure disclosed in the specifi-
cation into the means-plus-function clauses.91 The court held there
was no literal infringement because the accused sorters did not
"use the 'hard-wired' components or elements which performed
the identical functions as those described in the patent-in-suit, and
these machines do not make the color decision until after the fruit
has arrived at the electronic weight scale."92 Upon finding no lit-
eral infringement, the district court went on to apply the doctrine
of equivalents and thereby concluded that Durand-Wayland's sort-
ers were not infringing.
3
On appeal, Pennwalt argued that any embodiment which encom-
passes any function performed by the means described in the pat-
ent claims would literally infringe the patent.94 Specifically,
Pennwalt contended "that the district court erred in interpreting
the claims by going beyond the means-plus-function language of a
claim limitation and comparing the structure in the accused de-
vices with the structure disclosed in the specification."95 The ma-
jority responded to Pennwalt's contentions by explaining that
"section 112, paragraph 6 rules out the possibility that any and
every means which performs the function specified in the claim lit-
86. Id.
87. Pennwalt, 833 F2d at 933. The first accused device was called the "Microsizer"
which sorts by weight only. Id. The second accused device sorts by both color and weight
through the use of the "Microsizer" in conjunction with a color detection apparatus called a
"Microsorter." Id.
88. Id.
89. See Pennwalt, 225 USPQ at 560.
90. Id.
91. Id at 565.
92. Pennwalt, 225 USPQ at 569.
93. Id.
94. Pennwalt, 833 F2d at 933.
95. Id (emphasis in original).
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erally satisfies the limitation.""6 The court further explained that:
[i]f the required function is not performed exactly in the accused device, it
must be borne in mind that section 112, paragraph 6, equivalency is not
involved. Section 112, paragraph 6 plays no role in determining whether an
equivalent function is performed by the accused device under the doctrine
of equivalents.9 7
The court concluded that the district court therefore did not err
when it compared the accused sorters' structures to the structure
disclosed in Pennwalt's specification.8
The Federal Circuit then proceeded to address Pennwalt's
claims of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Pennwalt
argued "that the accused devices simply utilize a computer to per-
form the same activity the patent illustrates doing with hard-
wired circuitry, and that this alone is insufficient to escape in-
fringement."[Emphasis in original]. 9 The court replied by stating
that this was not the proper approach for determining infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents.' 0 Instead, the court ex-
plained that analysis of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents required an element-by-element comparison in order
to determine whether the accused devices possessed an equivalent
for each element. 10' Therefore, because the memory components of
the accused sorters were not programmed to perform all of the
functions the Pennwalt sorter could perform, the court rejected
Pennwalt's classification of the doctrine of equivalents issue as one
where Durand-Wayland simply substituted a software controlled
microprocessor for hard-wired electronic components.0 2 The Fed-
eral Circuit focused on the district court's finding that the accused
devices did not have any position-indicating means.10 3 Using the
district court's reasoning, the Federal Circuit then explained that
since the accused devices had no means that performed such a
96. Id at 934.
97. Pennwalt, 833 F2d at 934.
98. Id.
99. Pennwalt, 833 F2d at 935 (citing Decca Ltd. v United States, 544 F2d 1070,
1080-81 (1976)).
100. Pennwalt, 833 F2d at 935-39.
101. Id at 935.
102. Id at 939.
103. Id. Specifically the court stated that:
the [district] court concluded, as a fact, that no component in the Durand-Wayland
devices performed a function within the permissible range of equivalents for the func-




function, there could be no literal infringement.' 4 Likewise, the
court explained that because no means with an equivalent function
was substituted in the accused devices for performing the position-
indicating function as described in the Pennwalt patent, no in-
fringement could be found under the doctrine of equivalents
either.0 5
IV. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's opinion in Pennwalt fell short of supplying
all the answers to the questions surrounding the application of the
doctrine of equivalents. The foregoing cases illustrate that the fact-
intensive nature of infringement cases involving the application of
the doctrine of equivalents makes it difficult for the court to set
forth an all-encompassing equivalents analysis. This being the
case, the Pennwalt decision was somewhat of a disappointment to
many members of the patent bar.
Critics have stated that the court settled the wrong issue in
Pennwalt.'°6 Some commentators believe that the court should
have indicated exactly what an equivalent is, as opposed to focus-
ing on whether the doctrine of equivalents should be applied on an
element by element basis or whether it should be applied on an
entirety basis.0 7 These same commentators believe that until the
Federal Circuit answers this question, great uncertainty will sur-
round the doctrine of equivalents.108
Other commentators have expressed a concern for the "trilogy's"
treatment of means-plus-function clauses under section 112, para-
graph 6.109 Such commentators have suggested that in view of the
Federal Circuit's treatment of means-plus-function clauses, the
wise patent drafter will make every effort to minimize any extrane-
ous limitations in describing means-plus-function components
whenever possible."0 The uncertainty that still surrounds the doc-
104. Id.
105. Pennwalt, 833 F2d at 939.
106. See M. Adelman & G. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law:
Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U Pa L Rev 673, 695-700 (1989).
107. M. Adelman, Doctrine of Equivalents, 137 U Pa L Rev at 695 (cited in note 106).
108. Id at 696.
109. See Bretschneider, Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 Patent Law Annual 3-1, 18 (cited
in note 20).
110. Bretschneider, Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 Patent Law Annual at 3-21 (cited in
note 20). The author points out that one should not use the word 'means' indiscriminately.
Id at 3-19. He goes on to explain that "if the word 'means' does not appear in the claim,
then the statute and case law construing it do not come into play." Id.
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trine of equivalents demands that the patent drafter meticulously
choose the proper terminology when describing the scope of the
invention in the patent claims.
Indeed many questions have not yet been resolved by the Fed-
eral Circuit concerning the doctrine of equivalents. However, the
fact-intensive nature of its application may have patent practition-
ers walking the tightrope for years to come.
Thomas J. Edgington

